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CAESAR AS GOD’S BANKER:  
USING GERMANY’S CHURCH TAX AS AN EXAMPLE 
 OF NON-GEOGRAPHICALLY BOUNDED TAXING 
JURISDICTION 
STEPHANIE HOFFER

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Germany permits its religious organizations to tax their 
members.
1
 The tax, which is often collected by the state on behalf of 
those organizations, is part of the country’s constitutionally 
enshrined tradition of treating its large, lasting religious 
organizations as public law corporations.
2
 It is a practice that stands 
directly opposed to the American idea of religious liberty. 
Nonetheless, it is not as foreign as one might think. Many of the 
American colonies and the early states levied church taxes that were 
quite similar to Germany’s current system.3 The last of these taxes, 
which supported the churches of Massachusetts, survived until 
1833.
4
  
Notably, some of the arguments against the German system today 
are similar to those forwarded by famous voices of the American 
disestablishment. Despite the obvious dissimilarities of modern 
Germany and post-colonial America, critics from both periods have 
argued that church taxes result in undue governmental influence 
over religious organizations’ practices, violate citizens’ fundamental 
right to religious liberty, and are inappropriate in light of increased 
 
 
  Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. Many thanks 
to the innumerable colleagues whose hours of conversation and insightful comments have aided me 
during the creation of this work, not the least of whom are the wonderful Alexander Rust, Andrew 
Koppelman, Charlotte Crane, Ilan Benshalom, Kenworthey Bilz, Tonja Jacobi, Jide Nzelibe, Philip 
Postlewaite, Adam Rosenzweig, Miranda Fleisher, Carolyn Jones, Donald Tobin, John Quigley, Amy 
Cohen, David Perry, and participants of the Third Annual Junior Tax Scholars Conference. I also 
benefited from the research assistance of Michael Tucker, Jennifer DeVroy, Tonya Major Gauff, 
Joshua Foote, and wiki master Michael Perez. Last, but not least, thank you to Anne Lorentzen and 
Brandon Dobyns for their capable assistance in translation. All errors are, of course, my own.  
 1. See discussion infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 2. See discussion infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 3. See discussion infra Part III.  
 4. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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religious diversity.
5
 These shared concerns indicate some level of 
commonality between the two systems and suggest that the 
American experience, although antiquated, may hold lessons for 
those who would reform the German system. But fundamental 
differences—not the least of which is Germans’ ability to avoid the 
tax by disclaiming membership in the taxing organization—justify 
retention of the system within German borders. They also serve as a 
novel starting point for reconsidering geographic boundaries as the 
denominator of the local taxing power vested in political 
subdivisions within the United States. 
This Article compares the modern-day German church tax to 
church taxes levied by the American colonies and early states and 
concludes that, unlike its American counterparts, the German church 
tax is not wholly a ―church‖ tax. Rather, it is largely a form of 
decentralized local taxation, the jurisdiction of which is determined 
by voluntary group affinity rather than geography. As such, it is a 
crucial part of the German taxing landscape that should not be 
abandoned but should instead be retained and extended to qualifying 
secular organizations. In that context—secular rather than 
sectarian—the tax may also serve as the starting point for 
developing a model of non-geographically bounded taxing 
jurisdictions. 
Part II of the Article provides a brief description of the history 
and present state of the German law. Part III, which serves as a point 
of comparison, focuses on the history and decline of church taxes in 
the American colonies and early states. It concludes that unexpected 
 
 
 5. See infra notes 81–96, 140–43, 151–54, 166, 191–92, 199–206 and accompanying text. For 
instance, the Nürnberger Zeitung has endorsed a cultural tax born by all taxpayers as a fairer form of 
support. See Nancy Isenson, Quelling the Flight from the Church (Tax), DEUTSCHE WELLE, Apr. 13, 
2004, available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1168497,00.html. More recently, the debate 
on entanglement took an interesting turn when a retired religion professor convinced a Freiburg 
government administrator to allow him to disclaim membership in the Catholic church as a taxing 
corporation but not as a religion. Melanie Amann & Lisa Nienhaus, Kirchensteuer: Neun Prozent für 
das Seelenheil, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Sept. 29, 2009, excerpt translated in Church 
Tax: Nine Percent for Salvation, CONCORDAT WATCH, available at http://www.concordatwatch.eu/ 
showkb.php?org_id=1551&kb_header_id=33981&kb_id=35601. A court in Freiburg declared the 
action valid despite opposition from the church, but the decision was later reversed by a court of 
appeals which held that only the church could decide whether the two are separable. Id. At least one 
commentator has noted that opposition to the tax arises in part because churches ―have turned into 
omnipresent, profit-oriented social service concerns. Their central function, matters of faith, is thereby 
neglected.‖ Id.  
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de facto cooperation between Evangelical dissenters and 
Enlightenment thinkers, coupled with increased religious diversity, 
resulted in a fatal dissatisfaction with the early American church 
taxes. Part IV of the Article compares the two systems of taxation 
and concludes that because Germany’s system preserves 
institutional autonomy and is essentially non-mandatory, it 
adequately addresses the doctrinal concerns raised by Evangelical 
dissenters during the American disestablishment as well as the 
concerns of liberty raised by Enlightenment thinkers. Part V 
observes that although the modern German system preserves 
organizational autonomy and individual choice, it has not yet 
responded to the critical challenge of increased religious diversity in 
German society. A proper response to this development is crucial, 
because the church tax functions as a local tax that funds a 
substantial portion of locally provided public goods.
6
 Part VI of the 
Article concludes that the German system could best account for 
increasing secularism and religious diversity by conceptualizing the 
church tax as a means of funding public resources, including 
religious facilities, rather than as a means solely of supporting 
religion. Such a re-envisioning of the tax would necessitate greater 
inclusion of non-religious affinity groups, a possibility which was 
envisioned by the drafters of the Weimar constitution,
7
 but one 
which has never been fully realized. Finally, the Article posits that a 
similar non-geographically bounded taxing jurisdiction, if 
secularized, could be used to finance the provision of public goods 
by local governments or non-profit organizations within the United 
States. 
II. CHURCH TAXES IN GERMANY 
A. A Tumultuous History 
While the church tax in America was essentially an English 
import,
8
 in Germany, it emerged as a form of governmental 
 
 
 6. See infra notes 260–61 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra note 26. 
 8. See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
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compensation for seizures of church property and income during the 
decline of the Holy Roman Empire.
9
 The empire’s destabilization 
resulted in a lack of centralized governance that facilitated 
development of independent regional governments at a time when 
the Reformation was forcibly producing schism within the Christian 
Church.
10
 Because the church and the government had been 
inextricably intertwined under the empire, religious schism 
disrupted not only entrenched belief systems but also basic 
governance and social support, leaving the Germanic lands in 
chaos.
11
 Years of fighting ensued, and disorder allowed various 
regional rulers to seize ecclesiastical lands and other property, 
depriving churches of some of their traditional means of support.
12
 
An uneasy compromise emerged in the Religious Peace of 
Augsburg: with the pronouncement of ―cuius regio, euis religio,‖ 
the ruler of each region became responsible for selecting and 
ensuring financial support for that region’s religious affiliation.13 
The resulting mix of sects persisted throughout Prussian unification 
and made Germany unique among the European nations.
14
  
 
 
 9. In Germany, the Catholic Church was a powerful landholder during the years of the empire. 
Because the Church was essentially a sectarian head of government, the emperor relied on church 
officials for administration, which was naturally uncomfortable for both sides. The inevitable tension 
between secular and sectarian interests eventually led to violence, and the Church unceremoniously 
dethroned the ruling family of the day. In doing so, it necessarily stabbed at its own cohesion at a 
critical time in its own history, the years preceding the Reformation. Jan Deutsch, Some Problems of 
Church and State in the Weimar Constitution, 72 YALE L.J. 457, 457–58 (1963).  
 In contrast, the church tax in the colonies arose from two sources: the Puritan experiment with 
theocracy in New England, and the establishment of the Church of England in Virginia and the 
surrounding colonies. See D. B. ROBERTSON, SHOULD CHURCHES BE TAXED? 44–45 (The 
Westminster Press 1968).  
 10. Deutsch, supra note 9, at 458. See also Gerhard Robbers, State and Church in Germany, in 
STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 57 (Gerhard Robbers ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 
1996). The truce produced a recognition of the Catholic and Lutheran churches as ―essentially equal.‖ 
Id. at 58. 
 11. Robbers, supra note 10. 
 12. Roger Wells, The Financial Relations of Church and State in Germany 1919–1937, 53 POL. 
SCI. Q. 36, 39 (1938). 
 13. Reinhard Henkel, State-Church Relationships in Germany: Past and Present, 67 
GEOJOURNAL 307, 308 (2006). A similar principle is embodied in the Treaty of Westphalia, which 
ended the Thirty Years’ War. Id. 
 14. Deutsch, supra note 9, at 458. Germany remained relatively diverse with regard to religion, 
and despite General Bismarck’s Kulturkampf against the Catholic Church, the sectarian mix among 
regions persisted through the First World War. Id.; see also Henkel, supra note 13, at 309. 
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As time passed, the populations of towns and cities increased, 
which led to the creation of new urban congregations.
15
 Agricultural 
and productions tithes, which were traditionally administered by the 
church, became less relevant in the changing society. They were 
taken over by the state and eventually abolished.
16
 Regional 
governments were then faced with the problem of funding their 
churches in an increasingly industrial, trade-based economy.
17
 Like 
all governments in need of revenue, the regional governments of 
Germany turned to taxes for a solution. The principality of Lippe 
was the first region to institute a church tax, and over time, the idea 
spread to other regional governments.
18
 In its original iteration, the 
tax was levied by municipalities against their residents.
19
 Later, 
churches gained the power to levy the tax, but local governments 
retained the power of collection.
20
  
B. German Church Tax in Modernity 
1. Constitutional Basis for the Tax 
Although its roots are historically much deeper, the first federal 
codification of the church tax appeared after World War I in the 
Weimarer Reichsverfassung, the constitution of the Weimar 
Republic.
21
 The document was the result of a compromise between 
the Catholic-supported Center Party and the Social Democrats who 
favored strict separation.
22
 It recognized the importance of religion 
in Germany’s social fabric while acknowledging the necessity of 
 
 
 15. Christine R. Barker, Church and State Relationships in German ―Public Benefit‖ Law, 3 
INT’L J. OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. pt. V (2000), available at http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol3iss2/ 
art_1.htm.  
 16. Wells, supra note 12, at 43. These tithes generally required producers of agricultural goods 
and trade wares to transfer approximately one-tenth of their production output to the church. See 
Barker, supra note 15, pt. V.  
 17. See Barker, supra note 15, pt. V. 
 18. Wells, supra note 12, at 43. Lippe is located in the northeastern portion of modern-day North 
Rhine-Westphalia. The tax was adopted by Lippe in 1827, by Oldenburg in 1831, by Sachsen-
Altenburg in 1837, and by Saxony in 1838. Id.; see also Barker, supra note 15, pt. V.  
 19. Wells, supra note 12, at 43. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG art. 137.  
 22. Deutsch, supra note 9, at 460; see also WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG arts. 136–137. 
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religious freedom in a modern democracy.
23
 It guaranteed that 
political and civil rights would be afforded to citizens regardless of 
their religious affiliation and that no citizen would be bound to 
disclose his religious convictions to the government.
24
 It also 
guaranteed freedom of association for religious groups.
25
 In 
addition, at the behest of the Social Democrats, the constitution 
placed organizations that espouse a world philosophy on equal 
footing with traditional organizations that worship a deity.
26
 Finally, 
and most significantly, the Weimar constitution provided that 
religious bodies and world view organizations were entitled to seek 
status as public law corporations with a specifically enumerated 
right to tax their members.
27
 In short, while the constitution 
abolished state supervision of religious organizations, it did not 
forbid cooperation between church and state when the two 
organizations pursue a common goal, such as the provision of public 
goods and services. 
Although this obvious entanglement was strained under the Third 
Reich, it was not broken, and the church tax persisted in law if not 
in practice.
28
 Following World War II, the Grundgesetz, or 
 
 
 23. See Deutsch, supra note 9, at 460–64; see also WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG arts. 136–
137. 
 24. WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG art. 136. 
 25. Id. art. 137. 
 26. Id. art. 137; see Deutsch, supra note 9, at 464 (Social Democrats ensured that organizations 
devoted to systems of ethics were accorded the same constitutional privileges as religious 
organizations). Like Germany’s pre-war principalities, its post-war constitutional assembly was far 
from unified. Weimar’s Enlightenment leaders were forced to rely on the support of the Center Party, 
which was primarily Catholic, when crafting what was essentially a coalition constitution. See 
Deutsch, supra note 9, at 460. As a result, a constitution which otherwise might have called for strict 
separation of church and state now permits a level of government/state interaction that United States 
jurists would find astonishing. See Deutsch, supra note 9, at 463. 
 27. WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG art. 137; see Deutsch, supra note 9, at 464. 
 28. The National Socialists replaced Weimar’s federal system with a more highly centralized 
form of government, and they made an unsuccessful attempt to nationalize the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church. Wells, supra note 12, at 51–54. The effort produced a schism in the church’s leadership, with 
pro- and anti-government leaders both claiming to represent the true way. Id. at 51. The religious 
schism gave rise to a governmental dispute not over whether the church should be funded, but instead 
over who should receive the funds. Id. at 55. The country’s new leadership was openly frustrated by 
the church’s infighting. Reich Minister of the Interior Frick intimated that the government might strip 
the Evangelical Church of its status as a public law corporation, and Reich Minister of Propaganda 
Goebbels publicly stated that the government might withdraw its support from the church. Id. Almost 
unbelievably, the issue was delegated to a special tribunal, which took over two years to address the 
matter. Id. at 52–53. In the midst of the war, the government was forced to abandon the question and, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss4/3
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constitution, of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 
incorporated the Weimarer Reichsverfassung’s articles on religion 
by reference and made them fully applicable to the new western 
democracy.
29
 The situation in the German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany), however, was vastly different.
30
 Although church 
membership was nominally tolerated, it was discouraged.
31
 Church 
members were highly disfavored by the communist government and 
were denied many of the benefits of East German citizenship, such 
as they were.
32
 As a consequence of the state’s position, very few 
people maintained a religious affiliation.
33
 East Germany later 
acceded to the Grundgesetz by signing the Unification Treaty in 
1990, once again rendering Weimar’s articles on religion applicable 
to the whole of the country.
34
 By that time, however, the East 
German state’s actions had drastically reduced churches’ 
membership rolls.
35
 As a consequence, the church tax now generates 
very little revenue in the formerly communist states.
36
  
2. Today’s Church Tax in Practice 
Today, the Grundgesetz provides that there shall be no state 
church in Germany.
37
 Nonetheless, religious organizations that were 
 
 
fortunately, never received the opportunity to revisit it. In light of everything else that was happening, 
the tax proved to be remarkably hardy. 
 29. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Constitution] art. 140. 
 30. See Barker, supra note 15, pt. VI.  
 31. See John S. Conway, The ―Stasi‖ and the Churches: Between Coercion and Compromise in 
East German Protestantism, 1949–89, 36 J. CHURCH & ST. 725, 727–31 (1994). 
 32. Id. In addition, the East German state replaced religious confirmation services with a 
communist youth initiation ceremony called the ―Jugendweihe.‖ Remarkably, this practice has taken 
hold in the East and continues to this day. Barker, supra note 15, pt. VI. 
 33. Barker, supra note 15, pt. VI.  
 34. See Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic 
on the Establishment of German Unity (Unification Treaty), F.R.G.-G.D.R., Aug. 31, 1990, available 
at http://bundesrecht.juris.de/einigvtr/BJNR208890990. 
 35. At the time of the reunification, it was estimated that only 2–3% of the population still 
participated in religious services. Conway, supra note 31, at 742. 
 36. Only 5–10% of citizens in the former East Germany are affiliated with religious 
organizations. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GERMANY INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2008, 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108448.htm [hereinafter RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
REPORT]. 
 37. Article 140 of the Grundgesetz provides that Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution shall be 
incorporated by reference. GG art. 140. Article 137 provides that there shall be no state church. GG 
art. 137. 
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corporations under public law at the time of its adoption remain so, 
and new organizations may apply for the status.
38
 This status of 
public law corporation confers a number of important rights, 
including the right to employ clergy and other administrators as civil 
servants in the military, in hospitals, in universities, and in other 
public facilities.
39
 In addition, public law corporations are exempt 
from bankruptcy laws,
40
 corporate income tax, and inheritance and 
gift taxes.
41
 Representatives of religious organizations with public 
law corporation status have the right to participate on public boards, 
such as the supervisory boards of public and private broadcasting 
stations as well as boards that review films and literature for 
suitability.
42
 Public law corporations are also entitled to draft 
ordinances applicable to their members for the governance of the 
organization.
43
 These internal legal systems, ―which operate in 
parallel with public laws,‖ can be striking in their complexity, and 
decisions rendered within them fall outside of the jurisdiction of 
Germany’s courts.44 Finally, and importantly, religious 
organizations that are public law corporations have recourse to the 
church tax.
45
  
The Grundgesetz provides that a state must grant public law 
corporation status to any requesting organization whose constitution 
and number of members ensure permanency.
46
 In addition, a 
religious organization must show that it is not hostile to the 
constitutional order or to fundamental rights.
47
 This rule, enunciated 
 
 
 38. See WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG art. 137. 
 39. Barker, supra note 15, pt. I; see also WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG arts. 137, 140. 
 40. Gerhard Robbers, Minority Churches in Germany, LEGAL STATUS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 
IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEETING THESSALONIKI 153, 159 
(NOV. 19–20, 1993) [hereinafter Robbers, Minority Churches].  
 41. See Körperschaftsteuergesetz [KStG] [Corporate Tax Act], repromulgated Oct. 15, 2002, 
BGBl. I at 4144, last amended by Gesetz, Apr. 8, 2010, BGBl. I at 386, § 5(1)(9); Erbschaftsteuer- und 
Schenkungsteuergesetz [ErbStG] [Inheritance and Gift Tax Act] § 13(1)(16). Abgabenordnung [AO] 
[Tax Act], repromulgated Feb. 27, 2007, BGBl. I at 378, last amended by Gesetz, Dec. 22, 2009 BGBl. 
I at 3950, § 13(1)(6); Abgabenordnung [AO] [Tax Act], repromulgated Oct. 1, 2002, BGBl. I at 3866, 
§§ 51–68 (describing some of the qualifications that organizations must meet to obtain exempt status). 
 42. Robbers, Minority Churches, supra note 40, at 169. 
 43. See Robbers, supra note 10, at 62–64. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG art. 137; GG art. 140. 
 46. GG art. 140. 
 47. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 19, 2000, 102 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 370, 392; see also RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss4/3
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in a recent case by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which is the court 
of final jurisdiction for German constitutional questions,
48
 is 
intended to safeguard the limited partnership between the 
government and religious corporations envisioned by the 
constitution.
49
 As the high court noted, the constitution does not 
require fidelity from all religious organizations; however, those 
seeking partnership with the government through public law 
corporate status must show that they are not inimical to the values 
espoused by the Grundgesetz.
50
 The court solidified its position by 
observing that public law corporation status is no empty form: 
among other things, the court noted, it confers the capacity to 
employ civil servants and to levy taxes.
51
 These, the court wrote, are 
clear indicia of a measure of transferred sovereignty.
52
 It is natural 
that the government would not share its sovereignty with an 
organization that would seek to undermine it outside of 
constitutionally-permitted channels; thus, organizations seeking 
public law status must not seek to upset the constitutional order. 
All religious organizations that pass the court’s constitutional test 
are entitled to levy taxes against their members on the basis of the 
civil tax rolls in accordance with provisions of the states’ laws.53 
The two largest beneficiaries of the statutes are the Catholic and 
Evangelical churches.
54
 Although Germany does not keep official 
statistics on religious groups, it is estimated that of Germany’s 
approximately 82 million citizens, roughly 25.7 million are Catholic 
and roughly 25.3 million are Evangelical.
55
 These groups, both of 
 
 
REPORT, supra note 36; Thilo Marauhn, Status, Rights and Obligations of Religious Communities in a 
Human Rights Context: A European Perspective, 34 ISR. L. REV. 600, 633 (2000). 
 48. 102 BVerfGE at 392–97; GG art. 1 para. 3; see also Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [Law 
on the Federal Constitutional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGB1. I at 243, last amended by Gesetz art. 2, 
Dec. 1, 2009, BGB1. I at 3822, §§ 13–14.  
 49. 102 BVerfGE at 392–97. 
 50. Id. at 392. 
 51. Id. at 371. 
 52. Id. at 388. 
 53. Id. at 388–90. 
 54. See Robbers, supra note 10, at 57. 
 55. See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 36; see also Robbers, supra note 10, at 57 (in 
1991, there were an estimated 28.2 million Catholics and 29.2 Evangelicals). It is worth noting that the 
church-going populace is located substantially in West Germany. It is estimated that only between 5% 
and 10% of the populace of former East Germany are church members. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, 
supra note 36. 
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which pay the church tax, comprise roughly two-thirds of 
Germany’s population.56 A number of smaller groups also qualify as 
public law corporations. For instance, Jewish synagogues, the 
Salvation Army, the Latter Day Saints, and the German Humanist 
Association are all able to levy the church tax.
57
 The tax, then, is 
broad in its application. The paragraphs that follow summarize 
church tax provisions applicable in Berlin, Bavaria, and Saxony, 
whose statutes are generally representative of those enacted by other 
states. 
Under Germany’s constitution and the statutes of the states, a 
religious organization that seeks and receives public law corporation 
status may draft its own tax ordinances.
58
 These ordinances, which 
specify the details of an organization’s tax, must be approved by the 
state and are applicable to the organization’s members.59 State 
statutes generally provide various forms of taxation from which 
religious organizations may choose.
60
 They include an income tax, 
wealth tax, tax on real property, and the imposition of special church 
dues called the Kirchgeld.
61
 The Kirchgeld is a congregation-
specific tax that is not dependent upon income but is instead usually 
levied as a flat fee.
62
 In contrast, the income tax is levied as 8% or 
9% of the church member’s federal income tax liability.63 This 
results in an effective rate of roughly 3–4% of the member’s 
income.
64
 An organization may decide to impose only one kind of 
 
 
 56. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 36. 
 57. Barker, supra note 15, pt. III.  
 58. Kirchensteuergesetz des Bundeslandes Berlin [KiStG] [Berlin Church Tax Act], Apr. 2, 
2009, GVBl. Berlin at 23, § 1(1); Kirchensteuergesetz des Bundeslandes Sachsen [SächsKiStG] 
[Saxony Church Tax Act], Mar. 14, 2002, SächsGVBl. at 82, (last amended by Gesetz, Apr. 3, 2009, 
SächsGVBl. at 153, § 1; Kirchensteurgesetz des Bundeslandes Bayern [Bay KirStG] [Church Tax Act 
of the Federal State of Bavaria], Dec. 22, 2008, Bay. GVBl. at 973, § 1. 
 59. KiStG §§ 1(1), 12(1); SächsKiStG § 1(1).  
 60. See, e.g., KiStG § 3(1); SächsKiStG § 4(1); Bay KirStG § 4. 
 61. Bay KirStG § 4. 
 62. See also Barker, supra note 15, pt. V.  
 63. Id. This rate is determined by a conference of the taxing organizations. See, e.g., SächsKiStG 
§ 10(2). If the organizations cannot agree to a rate, the state finance administration must determine a 
rate. Id.; see also Robbers, supra note 10, at 69.  
 64. In general, the top marginal rate in Germany hovers between 45% and 50%, with most 
people in the 40% range. See KPMG, GERMAN TAX CARD (2010), available at http://www.kpmg.de/ 
docs/German_Tax_Card_2010_engl.pdf. If one assumes an individual income tax rate of 
approximately 40% and a church tax rate of 8% of income tax, the effective rate is approximately 
3.2% of income.  
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tax, but the Berlin and Saxony statutes specify that a religious 
organization may impose them concurrently.
65
 If an organization 
selects more than one mechanism of taxation, it may credit a 
member’s payment under one chosen regime against her liability 
under the other chosen regime.
66
 Liability is calculated on a 
calendar-year basis,
67
 and it is apportioned between spouses who 
file their federal income tax returns jointly but who are of different 
faiths.
68
 In addition, church taxes paid are fully deductible against 
income for purposes of calculating the federal income tax.
69
 
Notably, the tax is avoidable in its entirety. Because state statutes 
only grant to organizations taxing authority over their members, 
Germans who wish to avoid the tax can do so by simply disclaiming 
membership in the taxing organization.
70
  
State statutes charge religious organizations with administration 
and collection of the tax;
71
 however, religious organizations can, and 
generally do, enlist the state in their collection efforts.
72
 This is 
particularly true for the Catholic and Evangelical churches, which 
commonly make use of the government’s wage withholding 
 
 
 65. KiStG § 3(3); SächsKiStG § 4(1). 
 66. KiStG § 3(3); SächsKiStG § 4(4). 
 67. KiStG § 3(4). But see SächsKiStG § 2(4). The Saxon statute specifies that churches are not 
bound to the calendar year; however, this less restrictive rule applies only if the church tax base is 
something other than the income tax, which is almost never the case. If income tax is chosen as the 
church tax base, as it is by the two major churches in Saxony (Catholic and Evangelical), the calendar 
year must be used to calculate the liability. Id. 
 68. KiStG § 4; SächsKiStG §§ 7–8. 
 69. See Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Act], Oct. 16, 1934, RGBl. at 1005, 
repromulgated Oct. 8, 2009, BGBl. I at 3366, 3862, last amended by Gesetz, Apr. 8, 2010, BGBl. at 
386, § 10(1)(4). Furthermore, contributions to churches made in excess of church tax liability are 
deductible under EStG § 10(b)(1) so long as the deduction does not exceed 20% of the donor’s 
income.  
 70. See, e.g., SächsKiStG § 2 (church tax obligors are all natural persons who are members of the 
taxing church); SächsKiStG § 3 (to withdraw from church membership, taxpayers must follow either 
the individual procedure of the taxing church or file an official affidavit with a local government 
office). 
 71. See KiStG § 1(2) (administration of the tax is the obligation of the tax-entitled religious 
community unless otherwise provided by law). Enforcement of the taxes under the statute will be self-
administered by the tax-entitled religious community according to the Verwaltungs-
Vollstreckungsgesetz [VwVG] [Administration and Enforcement Act] of Apr. 27, 1953, BGBl. I at 
157, last amended by Gesetz, July 29, 2009, BGBl. I at 2258. KiStG § 11; see also Bay KirStG § 17(1) 
(levies must be administered by the religious organization, which may request the State Ministry of 
Finance to assume the collection function). 
 72. Robbers, supra note 10, at 69. 
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mechanism.
73
 Members of those churches, who represent roughly 
70% of Germany’s population, have church taxes withheld directly 
from their wages.
74
 The withheld amounts are remitted by members’ 
employers to the state, which remits them to the governing bodies of 
the members’ churches.75 The state’s tax administration and 
collection laws apply with exceptions for interest, fees, and criminal 
penalties.
76
 Finally, the churches themselves, as the taxing 
authorities, are competent to delay collection or entirely forgive a 
member’s liability.77 
Once a state has collected the church tax, it deducts a modest 
service fee and then redistributes the proceeds to the taxpayer’s 
religious organization of choice.
78
 Rather than redistribute the funds 
to the taxpayer’s particular congregation, the state instead directs 
them to the appropriate umbrella group.
79
 These include Germany’s 
twenty Catholic dioceses and its twenty-four Evangelical 
Landeskirchen in addition to a number of smaller groups.
80
 The 
umbrella organizations then pay their employees and redistribute the 
remaining funds to the individual congregations on the basis of 
need.
81
 This system has been criticized for its lack of transparency, 
but it enables the umbrella organizations to account for disparate 
levels of wealth within their constituent congregations.
82
 Thus, 
although a German taxpayer can be certain that her funds will 
remain within her religion and her region, she is not assured that 
they will reach her own congregation. 
 
 
 73. Barker, supra note 15, pt. V. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., SächsKiStG §§ 9–10. The state retains an administrative fee of 4–5% of the amount 
collected. See Robbers, Minority Churches, supra note 40, at 164. This administrative fee often 
discourages smaller churches from taking advantage of the state collection mechanism. Id. 
 76. KiStG § 7; Bay KirStG § 18(a); Kirchensteuergesetz des Bundeslandes Nordrhein-Westfalen 
[NWKiStG] [North Rhine-Westphalia Church Tax Act], Apr. 22, 1976, GV. NW. 1975 at 438, last 
amended by Gesetz, Nov. 18, 2008, GVBl. at 720, § 8(1)–(2). 
 77. KiStG § 9(3); Bay KirStG § 18(2); NWKiStG § 8(4). 
 78. See Robbers, Minority Churches, supra note 40, at 164; see also Barker, supra note 15, pt. V.  
 79. See Barker, supra note 15, pt. V. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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3. Criticisms of the Church Tax 
Although the church tax in various forms has been a part of 
German law since the mid 1800s, its future has increasingly come 
into question.
83
 Some critics of the tax have suggested that the use 
of legal coercion in connection with religious giving is 
inappropriate.
84
 Others have noted that the tax has grown obsolete in 
light of Germany’s increasingly secular nature.85 It may also be 
argued that the tax is unduly burdensome on those who pay it, 
because many who do not pay federal income taxes, such as retirees 
and the unemployed, are effectively exempt.
86
 In addition, the tax 
raises serious political questions about the nature of the relationship 
between state and religion in Germany.
87
 There also is a question of 
excessive entanglement: some believe that the state’s involvement 
in the church tax renders the large religious organizations dependent 
upon, and therefore inextricably bound to, the will of the state.
88
 As 
a result, some believe that the tax may compromise the political 
neutrality of religious organizations, causing them to remain silent 
on issues about which they would be naturally inclined to speak or 
causing them to speak in support of the government when they 
would otherwise remain silent.
89
 Still others find it inappropriate 
that the religious organizations have a substantial role in securing 
social welfare at the regional level.
90
  
Proponents of the church tax counter that the collection process is 
entirely bureaucratic and results in no substantive political 
connection between the state and religion.
91
 In addition, it would be 
too costly for churches to set up a collection system of their own.
92
 
Furthermore, proponents argue that state participation is equitable 
 
 
 83. FELIX HAMMER, RECHTSFRAGEN DER KIRCHENSTEUER 88–89 (Mohr Siebeck 2002) 
(unofficial translation on file with author). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 50–53. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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because churches shoulder the burden for a number of educational 
and social service programs that would otherwise be left to the 
government.
93
 It may also be argued that the tax increases religious 
organizations’ autonomy, freeing them from the tyranny of large 
donors who would seek to influence church policy.
94
 Finally, 
proponents point to the financial stability provided by the tax.
95
 
Without it, Germany’s religious organizations may be unable to 
sustain their current activities.
96
  
It is unclear whether the church tax in its present form can remain 
a viable part of German law and culture. The question is one of vital 
importance, since it is a significant source of funding for many of 
Germany’s locally provided public goods.97 In light of its 
significance and its uncertain prospects, the tax merits 
reexamination. Proponents both of retention and of reform may 
benefit from analysis of the United States’ experience with church 
taxes. Although the last United States church tax was abolished in 
1833, many aspects of the current German debate echo the United 
States’ colonial and early federal history.  
III. CHURCH TAXES IN THE COLONIES AND EARLY STATES 
In 1606, a colonial charter granted to the newly settled Virginians 
by King James I transplanted the English religious establishment, 
with its concomitant financial support, to the New World.
98
 
Likewise, the church of the Puritans received support from the 
colony’s sponsor, the Massachusetts Bay Company, as well as the 
proceeds of a tax passed by the colonial legislature in its first 
meeting.
99
 Most of the remaining colonies followed similar paths.
100
 
 
 
 93. See Robbers, supra note 10, at 63 (churches provide charitable works, the absence of which 
would vitiate the constitution’s guarantees of a social state). 
 94. Barker, supra note 15, pt. V. 
 95. Id. 
 96. The church tax is unquestionably the most important source of church revenue. HAMMER, 
supra note 83, at 80; see also Robbers, supra note 10, at 68 (the church tax may account for 80% of the 
church budget). 
 97. Barker, supra note 15, pt. V. 
 98. Joel H. Swift, To Insure Domestic Tranquility: The Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 473, 477–78 (1988). 
 99. Id. at 479. It is worth noting, however, that outside support of the Puritan churches was not 
ubiquitous. Puritans arriving at the Plymouth Colony in 1620, being dissenters from the Church of 
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Like Germany, then, the colonies displayed a mixture of state 
support of religion and regional diversity of ideology. Unlike their 
German counterparts, however, church taxes in the early federation 
of states were unable to successfully take root. Anti-establishment 
rhetoric surrounding the death of the church tax in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries drew heavily upon the 
Enlightenment thinkers’ emphasis on individual rights, as well as 
John Locke’s concept of separate temporal and spiritual 
jurisdictions. 
In 1776, as colonies began adopting their own constitutions and 
bills of rights, a substantial number chose to recognize religious 
freedom in response to widespread aversion to the establishment, 
but abolition of the church taxes proved controversial.
101
 Maryland 
was typical. It granted complete religious liberty to its Christian 
citizens but nonetheless maintained a general tax ―for the support of 
the Christian religion.‖102 Disestablishment took place state by state, 
beginning with Delaware and New Jersey in 1776 and ending in 
1833 with the Congregational Church in Massachusetts.
103
 The 
following paragraphs provide specific examples of Maryland’s 
church taxes as a representative example of the substance and arc of 
church taxes generally. They also describe two of the most heavily-
argued church tax repeals: those in Virginia and Massachusetts. The 
Virginia and Massachusetts debates provide valuable historical 
insight into why the taxes failed to survive. The subject is far from 
obsolete. A number of the arguments raised in the Massachusetts 
and Virginia debates are echoed in Germany today.  
A. Church Taxes in the Colonies: Examples from Maryland 
As demonstrated in the paragraphs that follow, each colony 
handled its affairs differently, and church taxes were generally 
 
 
England, did not provide for government support of their church. Id. at 478.  
 100. Id. passim. 
 101. Id. at 491–92. 
 102. Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1559, 1570–71 (1989). 
 103. Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early 
American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1457–58 (2004). 
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levied in two forms: the general poll, or head tax, necessary to 
support an established church, and special levies passed to support 
specific local projects. By the middle of the eighteenth century, 
Maryland had both.
104
 Although it was originally a haven for 
Catholicism,
105
 Maryland later established the Church of England, 
and the state’s laws provided for a church tax in lieu of tithes.106 
One such tax was ―yearly levy’d upon every Taxable person in 
every Parish‖ in the amount of forty pounds of tobacco, and its 
purpose was ―[f]or the Encouragement of able Ministers to come 
and reside in this Province . . . .‖107 
Other laws were narrower and addressed specific projects. For 
instance, in 1765, the General Assembly authorized the levy in 
response to the ―humble Petition‖ of the ―Rector, Vestrymen Church 
Wardens and other the principal Inhabitants of Saint Andrews Parish 
. . . .‖108 The petition ―set forth, that the Church of the said Parish is 
an Antient Building, very much gone to Ruin, so that it Cannot be 
Expected to Stand long nor is it practicable to repair the same 
. . . .‖109 In response, the authorization required the justices of the 
Saint Mary’s County Court to assess a tax against the parish’s 
―Taxable Inhabitants‖ of 200,000 pounds of tobacco, to be collected 
 
 
 104. For an example of a general tax, see Abridgment of the Laws of Religion, 193 ARCH. MD. 62 
(1704), available at http://www.msa.md.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000193/ 
pdf/am193--62.pdf. For an example of a project-specific tax, see An Act to enable the Justices of Saint 
Marys County Court to Assess and Levy on the Taxable Inhabitants of Saint Andrews Parish a 
quantity of Tobacco for Building a Church and for other Purposes therein mentioned, 59 ARCH. MD. 
264 (1765), available at http://aomol.net/000001/000059/pdf/am59--264.pdf.  
 105. See Patricia Bonomi, UNDER THE COPE OF HEAVEN: RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN 
COLONIAL AMERICA 21 (2003). Lord Baltimore and the other proprietors, while Catholic, did not 
mention Catholicism in the charter for fear of stirring up anti-Catholic sentiment. Id. Nonetheless, 
there was a Protestant revolt in 1645. Id. at 22. In an attempt to keep the peace and preserve some 
measure of freedom for all of the colony’s inhabitants, the assembly passed the ―Act Concerning 
Religion,‖ which was later known as the ―Act of Toleration,‖ in 1649. Id. Nonetheless, the colony later 
established the Church of England in 1688, when William of Orange appointed a royal governor over 
Maryland. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1487. 
 106. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1487 n.350. 
 107. Abridgment of the Laws of Religion, 193 ARCH. MD. 62 (1704), available at http://www. 
msa.md.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000193/pdf/am193--62.pdf. 
 108. An Act to enable the Justices of Saint Marys County Court to Assess and Levy on the 
Taxable Inhabitants of Saint Andrews Parish a quantity of Tobacco for Building a Church and for 
other Purposes therein mentioned, 59 ARCH. MD. 264 (1765), available at http://aomol.net/000001/ 
000059/pdf/am59--264.pdf.  
 109. Id. 
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by the sheriff in three annual installments.
110
 The proceeds were to 
be ―applyed to the finishing and compleating a Parish Church for the 
Use of the said Parishioners and to no other use or purpose 
whatsoever.‖111 
Not all special assessments related to building needs. An undated 
petition from St. Paul’s Parish in Baltimore County prayed for a tax 
of three pounds of tobacco per taxable inhabitant because the church 
had ―a very good Organ‖ and wished to hire ―an Organist to Play the 
same.‖112 In 1758, the taxable inhabitants of Charles County were 
subjected to a tax of two pounds of tobacco annually for payment of 
the organist at the Port Tobacco Church.
113
 In contrast, when St. 
Anne’s Parish requested a tax of eight pounds of tobacco to pay a 
foreign organist, the petition was promptly rejected.
114
  
This system of taxation remained largely unchanged until 
Maryland adopted its first constitution in 1776.
115
 The constitution, 
which eliminated the single church establishment, authorized the 
legislature to enact taxes for the support of churches generally.
116
 
Because the state no longer had a single established church, taxes 
collected pursuant to the authorization were to be distributed to the 
church of each taxpayer’s membership.117 This arrangement, often 
referred to as ―multiple establishment‖ or ―general establishment,‖ 
was not uncommon at the time, and a number of other states adopted 
similar provisions.
118
 In addition, the constitution provided that the 
Church of England would retain the land that it owned and that 
church tax laws enacted by the legislature would remain in effect 
 
 
 110. Id. at 265, available at http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/ 
000059/pdf/am59--265.pdf. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Petition from Sundry Inhabitants of St. Paul’s Parish, Baltimore County, for Legislative 
Authority to Hire an Organist, Circa 1760–1761, 61 ARCH. MD. 499, available at http://www.msa.md. 
gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000061/pdf/am61--499.pdf.  
 113. Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly, 1758–1761, Introduction, 56 ARCH. MD. at 
xxiii, available at http://www.msa.md.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000056/pdf/ 
am56p--23.pdf. 
 114. Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly, 1762–1763, Introduction, 58 ARCH. MD. at 
xxv, li, available at http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000058/pdf/am58p-
-25.pdf and http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000058/pdf/am58--S1.pdf. 
 115. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1489. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. passim. 
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until their expiry or repeal, despite the constitution’s passage.119 
Nonetheless, Anglican efforts to capitalize on the constitution’s 
authorization for additional levies proved unpopular, and religious 
assessments were almost entirely phased out by 1785.
120
 Finally, in 
1810, Maryland amended its constitution and revoked the 
legislature’s power to levy religious assessments.121 
When considered in retrospect, Maryland’s colonial church tax 
statutes are remarkably quaint, but these and similar establishments 
were controversial throughout the colonies. The following sections 
discuss memorable and informative debates that erupted in Virginia 
and Maryland in response to very similar general establishment and 
church tax provisions. 
B. Why Were Church Taxes Repealed?: The Case of Virginia 
Like a number of other southern states, Virginia initially had a 
rigid establishment of the Church of England.
122
 The law provided 
for land grants to the church, compulsory attendance, punishment of 
blasphemy, and religious oath tests.
123
 Naturally, dissent was not 
tolerated.
124
 Rather, ―all nonconformists vpon notice of them shall 
be compelled to depart the collony with all conveniencie.‖125 The 
assembly, which was not averse to the seizure of property for 
religious ends, freely imposed penalties for noncompliance. For 
instance, the law provided that ―whosover shall absent himselfe 
from divine service any Sunday without an allowable excuse shall 
forfeite a pound of tobacco. . . .‖126 Parishioners who were absent 
for an entire month paid a heftier sum: fifty pounds of tobacco.
127
 
 
 
 119. Id. at 1490. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1491. 
 122. The relevant act provided that ―there be an uniformity in our church as neere as may be to the 
canons in England; both in substance and circumstance, and that all persons yeild readie obedience 
unto them under paine of censure.‖ WILLIAM WALLER HENING, HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE I, 
1619–1660 123 (R.& W.& G. Borton 1823).  
 123. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 102, at 1563. 
 124. Id. 
 125. HENING, supra note 122, at 277. 
 126. Id. at 123. 
 127. Id. 
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It comes as no surprise that, in this climate, Virginia taxed its 
citizens on behalf of the established church. Church taxes in 
Virginia were similar to those in Maryland. Both as a colony and as 
an early state, Virginia levied a religious tax.
128
 In form, it was a 
head tax levied on ―tithables.‖129 Although the tax was paid by the 
heads of estates, tithables included anyone capable of generating 
income: all male persons and all slave or Indian women above the 
age of sixteen.
130
 Proceeds of the tax were used for expenses of the 
colonial and county governments, as well as for expenses of the 
parish.
131
 The amount of the tax to be collected on behalf of the 
parish was calculated by adding together the parish expenses and 
dividing them by the number of tithables, regardless of their 
religious denomination or participation.
132
 A man’s tax liability, 
then, was the result of this calculation multiplied by the number of 
tithables for which he was responsible, including himself.
133
  
In 1624, when Virginia became a royal colony, the tithe was 
payable out of men’s agricultural bounty. The statute provided 
―[t]hat no man dispose of any of his tobacco before the minister be 
satisfied, upon pain of forfeiture double his part of the minister’s 
means,‖ which were collected ―out of the first and best tobacco and 
corn.‖134 In 1629, the assembly added, ―It is thought fitt that all 
those that worke in the ground of what qualitie or condition soever, 
shall pay tithes to the ministers.‖135 The sum of the tax was not 
insubstantial. In 1727, ministers’ salaries were 16,000 pounds of 
tobacco per year.
136
 In addition, each parish was required to set 
aside 200 acres for the construction of a parsonage, and the 
 
 
 128. John P. Alcock, What Genealogists Should Know about 18th Century Virginia Law, 
Presentation to Friends of the Virginia State Archives, Nov. 17, 1999, available at http://www. 
kykinfolk.com/marshall/~woliver/Virginia_Law.html. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. HENING, supra note 122, at 124. 
 135. Id. at 144. 
 136. WILLIAM WALLER HENING, HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE 4, 1711–1736 204 (1820) 
(reprinted, University Press of Virginia 1969). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
614 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:595 
 
 
 
 
vestrymen of the parish were authorized to levy an additional tax for 
construction of the buildings.
137
 
The situation was unsustainable. As religious diversity increased 
under the influence of the Great Awakening, discontent with the 
general establishment, and in particular its church taxes, grew.
138
 
Scholars have estimated that by the 1750s, at least one of every five 
Virginians was a dissenter.
139
 In fact, Thomas Jefferson thought the 
number to be closer to two of every three.
140
 Naturally, then, 
religious liberty was an important topic of debate when Virginia 
adopted its first Bill of Rights.
141
 
At the time of Virginia’s convention, anti-establishment, anti-
church tax sentiment was widespread.
142
 Petitioners from all parts of 
the state made appeals for religious freedom and abolition of the 
church tax.
143
 For instance, a representative petition, received from 
citizens of Prince Edward County, urged that ―every tax upon 
conscience and private judgment [be] abolished.‖144 The statesmen 
received similar pleas from Albemarle, Amherst, Buckingham, 
Richmond, Culpepper, and Augusta counties, among others.
145
 Yet 
even in the face of such widespread opposition, a number of the 
delegates believed that free exercise and the general establishment 
could co-exist.
146
 As a result, section 16 of the Declaration of Rights 
guaranteed free exercise to Virginians but failed to prohibit a 
general church tax.
147
 The delegates nonetheless realized that a tax 
 
 
 137. Id. at 206–07. Vestrymen were a group of members who managed the temporal affairs of the 
church, serving a function equivalent to today’s modern church council. See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD 
DICTIONARY (3d College ed. 1988). 
 138. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1416 (the Great Awakening increased religious diversity in 
Virginia between the 1720s and the 1750s). 
 139. See FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 
226 (Princeton University Press 2003). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Marc Arkin, ―The Intractable Principle:‖ David Hume, James Madison, Religion, and 
the Tenth Federalist, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 148, 170 (1995). 
 142. See Irving Brant, Madison: On the Separation of Church and State, 8 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 6 
(1951). 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Arkin, supra note 141, at 170. 
 147. See VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776), available at http://www.nationalcenter. 
org/VirginiaDeclaration.html; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 102, at 1569. Section 16 of the 
Declaration, which was drafted by George Mason, provided the following:  
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in support of the Anglican establishment was no longer politically 
viable, even if an exception were made for dissenters.
148
 
Accordingly, Virginia suspended the tax in 1776 pending further 
discussion, and it was fully repealed in 1779.
149
 
Suspension of the church tax did not suspend the debate. In fact, 
the real story of its repeal was just beginning. The period following 
Virginia’s adoption of the Declaration of Rights brought forth some 
of the most famous rhetoric on religious freedom in United States 
history. Although modern jurists and scholars learn of the epic 
struggle between Madison, Jefferson, and Patrick Henry in the 
context of the First Amendment, it was, in important ways, a debate 
about the church tax.
150
  
Both Virginia’s evangelists and her Enlightenment thinkers 
remained leery of the Declaration of Rights.
151
 Although the two 
groups made unlikely bedfellows, they strove in tandem toward the 
common goal of religious liberty.
152
 Both remained concerned that 
the legislature would enact a general church tax that would force 
taxpayers to participate in government sponsorship of religion. 
Furthermore, both worried that religious observances, including 
giving, were devoid of meaning as products of force. In response to 
these concerns, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Virginia Act for 
Establishing Religious Freedom in 1777.
153
 The Act declared that 
―to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the 
 
 
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can 
be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are 
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and 
that it is the mutual duty of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity toward each 
other. 
 148. See Arkin, supra note 141, at 170; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 102, at 1573. 
 149. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 102, at 1573. 
 150. As such, it may shed light on the viability of Germany’s current system. 
 151. See DENISE LARDNER CARMODY & JOHN TULLY CARMODY, THE REPUBLIC OF MANY 
MANSIONS: FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 90 (Paragon House 1990); LAMBERT, 
supra note 139, at 221–22; John Witte, Jr., The Theology and Politics of the First Amendment Religion 
Clauses: A Bicentennial Essay, 40 EMORY L.J. 489, 492–94 (1991). 
 152. Witte, supra note 151, at 492–94. 
 153. See CARMODY & CARMODY, supra note 151, at 96–97; Daniel L. Dreisbach, A New 
Perspective on Jefferson's Views on Church-State Relations: The Virginia Statute for Establishing 
Religious Freedom in Its Legislative Context, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 172 (1991). The statute is 
available in WILLIAM WALLER HENING, HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE 12, at 84–86 (1823) 
(reprinted, University Press of Virginia 1969). 
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propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and 
tyrannical . . . .‖154 Jefferson then added, ―even the forcing him to 
support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is 
depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions 
to the particular pastor, whose morals he would make his pattern 
. . . .‖155 Accordingly, the Act provided that no man would be 
―compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or 
ministry whatsoever . . . .‖156 Furthermore, no man would be 
―enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods 
. . . .‖157 The law was ahead of its time, though, and found no 
support in the 1777 legislature.
158
 
The Virginia debate resurfaced at the conclusion of the 
Revolutionary War. In 1784, Patrick Henry supported the ―Bill 
Establishing a Provision for the Teachers of the Christian Religion,‖ 
which, if passed, would have levied a general church tax on 
Virginia’s citizens.159 The bill’s tax assessment was a general one, 
allowing taxpayers to designate the church to which the collected 
funds would be distributed.
160
 County sheriffs would collect the 
levy, and after setting aside 5% as compensation, they would deliver 
it to the church designated by each taxpayer.
161
 The bill was not 
without support. Both John Marshall and George Washington 
favored it.
162
 In a letter to George Mason, Washington wrote, ―I 
must confess, that I am not amongst the number of those who are so 
 
 
 154. HENING, supra note 153, at 85. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. at 86. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See CARMODY & CARMODY, supra note 151, at 96–97; Dreisbach, supra note 153, at 173. 
 159. See Patrick Henry, A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, 
reprinted in THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL EDITION V.2009.03 (Theodore J. Crackel 
ed., University of Virginia Press 2007), available at http://candst.tripod.com/assessb.htm. For 
discussions of the bill, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY 71–72 (University of 
California Press 1998); Dreisbach, supra note 153, at 173; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 102, at 
1573; Brant, supra note 142, at 7. 
 160. HENRY, supra note 159. The bill provided that ―for every sum so paid, the Sheriff or 
Collector shall give a receipt, expressing therein to what society of Christians the person from whom 
he may receive the same shall direct the money to be paid . . . .‖ Id.  
 161. Id. 
 162. See Dreisbach, supra note 153, at 173. 
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much alarmed at the thoughts of making people pay towards the 
support of that which they profess . . . .‖163  
As Washington’s sentiment suggests, the bill itself was not 
extraordinary. Similar assessments were imposed by other states, 
including Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maryland, 
and Georgia.
164
 Maryland’s constitution, for instance, explicitly 
permitted such an arrangement.
165
 It provided that the legislature 
could, in its discretion, levy a church tax so long as each individual 
possessed ―the power of appointing the payment over of the money 
collected from him, to the support of any particular place of worship 
or minister, or for the benefit of the poor of his own denomination, 
or the poor in general of any particular county . . . .‖166 Likewise, the 
Massachusetts constitution provided that the legislature had the 
power to require towns, parishes, or religious societies ―to make 
suitable provision, at their own expence, for the institution of the 
public worship of GOD, and for the support and maintenance of 
public protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality, in all cases 
where such provision shall not be made voluntarily.‖167 The 
constitution required that the proceeds of any such levy would be 
―uniformly applied‖ to the taxpayer’s own religious sect if he so 
chose.
168
 These provisions, which mirror those of Patrick Henry’s 
bill, demonstrate that although general church taxes were not 
ubiquitous, they were both common and accepted in the early states.  
But Henry’s bill, however unexceptional, provoked an 
exceptional response. James Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments directly attacked 
Henry’s proposal.169 In it, Madison wrote: ―Who does not see . . . 
 
 
 163. See THE FOUNDERS ON GOD AND GOVERNMENT 3 (Daniel L. Dreisbach et al ed., 2004). 
 164. JAMES H. HUTSON, RELIGION AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 66 (1998). 
 165. See MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights art. XXXIII (1776), amended by MD. CONST. 
Declaration of Rights art. XXXVI (1867) and Chap. 558, Acts of 1970. 
 166. Id. Other states’ constitutions authorized a general church levy but were less explicit. For 
instance, Georgia’s governing document specified that no man ―shall . . . ever be obliged to pay tithes, 
taxes, or any other rate, for the building or repairing any place of worship, or for the maintenance of 
any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right, or hath voluntarily engaged to do.‖ 
GA. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (1798). 
 167. MASS. CONST. 1st pt., art. III (1781). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 153, at 1574; Dreisbach, supra note 153, at 173. In the 
Memorial, Madison wrote that religion is a duty that people owe to their creator, ―and the manner of 
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that the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three 
pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, 
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases 
whatsoever?‖170 The Memorial garnered tremendous support.171 One 
thousand five hundred fifty-two people signed the document itself, 
and an avalanche of ninety additional petitions with nearly 11,000 
signatories followed.
172
 As a result, Henry’s bill never made it to the 
floor of the assembly.
173
 Instead, the legislature took an opposite 
course and finally adopted Jefferson’s Virginia Act for Establishing 
Religious Freedom in 1786.
174
 Passage of the Act marked the 
definitive end of the church tax in Virginia,
175
 although the 
establishment debate that it generated remains with us even today. 
C. Why Were Church Taxes Repealed?: The Case of Massachusetts 
Massachusetts’s path to establishment, while also rooted in 
England, was vastly different from that of Virginia. Unlike the 
Virginians, who traveled to the New World with profit in mind, the 
pilgrims hoped to build a Christian commonwealth governed by 
biblical teachings.
176
 They adopted a Congregational form of 
government from their earliest days.
177
 The ecclesiastical and civil 
boundaries of their towns were one and the same: the concept of a 
 
 
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.‖ James 
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), available at 
http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison_m&r_1785.html. In this, Madison drew upon 
the sentiment of John Locke: ―The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his 
power consists only in outward force; but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of 
the mind . . . .‖ John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), available at http://www. 
constitution.org/jl/tolerati.htm; see also Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and 
Religious Exemptions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 215, 228–29 (2009). Thus, Madison argued, the right to free 
exercise is inalienable both because one’s religion ―cannot follow the dictates of other men,‖ and 
because the duty to render acceptable homage to the Creator ―is precedent, both in order of time and in 
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.‖ Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance. 
Accordingly, religion is ―wholly exempt from its cognizance.‖ Id.  
 170. Madison, supra note 169. 
 171. See Brant, supra note 142, at 11. 
 172. See Arkin, supra note 141, at 172. 
 173. See Dreisbach, supra note 153, at 174. 
 174. Id. For a description of Jefferson’s Act, see supra notes 151–56. 
 175. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 102, at 1574. 
 176. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1422 (1990); Adams & Emmerich, supra note 102, at 1563. 
 177. See McConnell, supra note 176, at 1422. 
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separate secular government did not exist for the Massachusetts 
settlers.
178
 Political franchise, of course, was limited to church 
members.
179
 As a result, the hand of the church was strong: 
congregations such as John Cotton’s were warned to mind the 
boundaries of civil leadership.
180
 In matters of religion and morality, 
the church was superior, and in these areas, the civil government 
dared not tread without the approval and participation of the 
church.
181
 
Naturally, the Massachusetts churches were supported by 
taxation.
182
 The church tax, which was levied locally, was officially 
recognized as early as the 1630s.
183
 In 1652, the law provided that 
taxes to support ―convenient habitation for the use of the ministry in 
every town . . .‖ would be levied ―in a particular sum upon each 
person assessed by just rate . . . .‖184 This amount was collected in 
the same manner as ―other cases of town rates,‖185 which meant that 
the tax was enforced by the town constable.
186
  
The settlers’ choice of Congregational government proved 
unlucky for dissenters. Those who did not conform were actively 
persecuted.
187
 The Congregationalists believed, as John Ward wrote, 
that ―[p]olipiety [a variety of sects] is the greatest impiety in the 
 
 
 178. Id.; John Witte, Jr., One Public Religion, Many Private Religions, THE FOUNDERS, supra 
note 163, at 30. As Professor Robin Einhorn has observed, towns often began with a religious compact 
among the founders whose first actions were to hire a minister and build a meeting house. Robin Leigh 
Einhorn, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 61–62 (University of Chicago Press 2006). The 
boundaries between the town and the church were essentially indistinguishable and seemingly 
avoidable only by moving beyond the established borders of any town. Id. 
 179. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 102, at 1563. 
 180. John Cotton, An Exposition Upon the Thirteenth Chapter of the Revelation, 71–73 (London, 
1655), reproduced in James F. Cooper, Jr., Higher Law, Free Consent, Limited Authority: Church 
Government and Political Culture in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts, 69 NEW ENGLAND Q. 201 
(1996). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See McConnell, supra note 176, at 1422; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 102, at 1563. 
 183. See Kelly Olds, Privatizing the Church: Disestablishment in Connecticut and Massachusetts, 
102 J. POL. ECON. 277, 278 (1994). 
 184. RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW 
ENGLAND, VOL. 2, 1628–1641, § 702, at 217 (Nathaniel B. Shurtloff ed., Press of William White 
1863). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See 3 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW 
ENGLAND, § 431 (1654) (appointing ―the constable of the town to collect the same and distribute the 
said assessment upon such as refuse to pay.‖). 
 187. See McConnell, supra note 176, at 1423; Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1415; Adams & 
Emmerich, supra note 102, at 1563. 
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world.‖188 Accordingly, dissenters were expelled, sometimes 
violently.
189
 Thus, the Pilgrim colony, originally peopled by 
religious seekers, was an inhospitable environment for the 
independent-minded. Although actual violence against dissenters 
tapered off in the late seventeenth century, political 
disenfranchisement and religious intolerance remained 
problematic.
190
 
Just as in Virginia, the tide began to slowly turn with the dawn of 
the Great Awakening.
191
 The popular Evangelical movement spread 
religious diversity throughout the colonies during the mid-seventeen 
hundreds, and Massachusetts was not spared.
192
 At the close of the 
Revolutionary War, the fastest growing sects in the newly-formed 
state were Evangelical.
193
 The converts believed that God had not 
surrendered his sovereignty to the state, and that he did not need the 
state’s assistance in raising revenue.194 Religious uniformity became 
impossible, and dissenters were sometimes permitted to direct their 
tax dollars to ministers of their own denomination.
195
 Nonetheless, 
the Massachusetts establishment weathered the Revolutionary War 
with greater aplomb than most.
196
 Unlike the Quakers, who 
remained neutral, and the Anglicans, who were at least nominally 
 
 
 188. See McConnell, supra note 176, at 1422. 
 189. Id. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1415; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 102, at 1563. 
Baptists were explicitly banished by statute in 1644, and in one of the more notorious instances of 
intolerance in colonial history, four Massachusetts Quakers were executed by hanging after returning 
from expulsion. See McConnell, supra note 176, at 1423. Of course, the Salem Witch Trials also come 
to mind.  
 190. McConnell, supra note 176, at 1423. For instance, Quakers were forbidden from publicly 
meeting until 1697. See BONOMI, supra note 105, at 29. 
 191. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1416. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See LAMBERT, supra note 139, at 221. 
 194. Id. See William H. Leach, Financing the Local Church, 332 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 70, 73 (1960). The evangelicals were not the only people who were worried. In his address to 
members of the Boston Missionary Society, Seneca chief, Red Jacket, had this to say: 
Brother: you say you have not come to get our land or our money, but to enlighten our minds. 
I will now tell you that I have been at your meetings, and saw you collect money from the 
meeting. I cannot tell what this money was intended for, but suppose that it was for your 
minister, and if we should conform to your way of thinking, perhaps you may want some 
from us.  
Red Jacket, Speech to the Iroquois Six Nations (1805), http://churchstatelaw.com/historicalmaterials 
/8_2_4.asp. 
 195. See LAMBERT, supra note 139, at 221; Olds, supra note 183, at 278–79. 
 196. See McConnell, supra note 176, at 1437. 
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loyal to England, the Congregationalist leaders aligned themselves 
with the colonies in the fight for independence.
197
 As a 
consequence, the Massachusetts establishment maintained an 
element of vitality that its Virginian counterpart lacked,
198
 which 
helped to postpone the inevitable church tax repeal.
199
  
The Evangelical movement in Massachusetts eventually found its 
defining voice in Isaac Backus.
200
 A Baptist convert and outspoken 
preacher, Backus viewed the Congregational establishment as a 
government incursion of sectarian jurisdiction.
201
 Like Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance, Backus echoed Locke: ―it is needful 
to observe, that God has appointed two kinds of government in the 
world, which are distinct in their nature, and ought never to be 
confounded together; one of which is called civil, the other 
ecclesiastical government.‖202 The civil government, according to 
Backus, exceeded its authority when it levied taxes on behalf of the 
ecclesiastical government.
203
  
Backus also recognized Massachusetts’s establishment as an 
affront to the principles upon which the revolution was founded.
204
 
He analogized the Baptist claim for relief from church taxes to the 
patriots’ claims for relief from English taxes.205 Furthermore, 
 
 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See LAMBERT, supra note 139, at 221–25. 
 200. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1432. 
 201. See id. at 1435. 
 202. See Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty Against the Oppressions of 
the Present Day (1773), available at http://churchstatelaw.com/historicalmaterials/8_2_7.asp. 
 203. Id. Even Solomon, Backus observed, was not entrusted with governance over church affairs; 
rather, the exact dimensions of the Temple and the courses of priests and Levites had been dictated to 
him by God. Id. ―How came the people of the world,‖ Backus then queried, ―by any ecclesiastical 
power?‖ Id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1436; see LAMBERT, supra note 139, at 224. This position was 
also taken by another Baptist minister, John Allen. See LAMBERT, supra note 139, at 224. In an 
address to the Massachusetts General Court, Allen said the following: 
You tell your governor that the Parliament of England have no right to tax the Americans . . . 
because they are not the representatives of America; and will you dare to tax the Baptists for a 
religion they deny? Are you gentlemen their representatives before GOD, to answer for their 
souls and consciences any more than the representatives of England are the representatives of 
America? . . . [I]f it be just in the General Court to take away my sacred and spiritual rights 
and liberties of conscience and my property with it, then it is surely right and just in the 
British Parliament to take away by power and force my civil rights and property without my 
consent; this reasoning, gentlemen, I think is plain. 
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Backus attacked the premise that church taxes were necessary for 
the preservation of civil society.
206
 He observed rather caustically of 
the Congregational leaders: 
[W]hen it comes to be calmly represented, that, religion is 
voluntaty [sic] obedience unto God, which therefore force 
cannot promote; how soon do they shift the scene, and tell us, 
that religious liberty is fully allowed to us, only the state have 
in their wisdom thought fit to tax all the inhabitants, to support 
an order of men for the good of civil society. A little while 
ago it was for religion, and many have declared, that without it 
we should soon have no religion left among us: but now tis to 
maintain civility. Though by the way it is well known, that no 
men in the land, have done more to promote uncivil treatment 
of dissenters from themselves, than some of these pretended 
ministers of civility have done.
207
 
The power to levy church taxes for the preservation of civility 
had reinforced the power of Massachusetts leaders to perpetrate 
incivility against their Baptist, Methodist, and Quaker neighbors. 
For instance, Backus noted that church taxes, left unpaid, could 
result in the debtor’s imprisonment.208 Local ministers and other 
officials, even knowing the inevitable result, often refused to release 
the debt.
209
 Backus added, ―we have had instances of serious 
christians, who must have died in prison for ministers rates, if 
christianity and humanity had not moved people to provide them 
that relief, which neither those ministers nor the law that upholds 
them have done.‖210 
 
 
Id. In a Boston pamphlet, Backus added: 
These evils cleaved so close to the first fathers of the [sic] Massachusetts, as to move them to 
imprison, whip and banish men, only for denying infant baptism, and refusing to join in 
worship that was supported by violent methods: yet they were so much blinded as to declare, 
That [sic] there was this vast difference between these proceedings and the coercive measures 
which were taken against themselves in England . . . . 
Backus, supra note 202. 
 206. Backus, supra note 202. 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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Backus’s story continued in September of 1779, when delegates 
to Massachusetts’s Constitutional Convention called upon him to 
assist them in drafting the state’s new Bill of Rights.211 Backus’s 
proposal would have ensured free exercise and would have revoked 
the state’s power to levy taxes on behalf of churches, whether or not 
apportioned on the basis of taxpayers’ membership.212 It would 
finally have freed Baptists and other dissenters from a duty that they 
believed to be illegitimate. But Backus’s work was rejected, and the 
Convention instead opted to incorporate an article that authorized 
the legislature to promulgate general church taxes.
213
  
Article III, which was adopted in lieu of Backus’s provision, 
proved to be contentious both before and after its passage.
214
 The 
article provided that the Commonwealth could require the towns to 
support ―the Public worship of GOD‖ at their own expense.215 In 
addition, the article allowed any dissenter to direct tax dollars to his 
own denomination, provided that he regularly attended worship 
there.
216
 Although the article needed a 66% rate of approval to pass, 
it received only 59% of the vote.
217
 A number of the disapproving 
votes, however, contained suggestions for amendment.
218
 The 
Convention decided not to count these ballots, and their exclusion 
led to the article’s passage.219 Despite the fact that, at the time of the 
Convention, Massachusetts had levied a general church tax for over 
a century, the debate did not end with the tax’s elevation to 
constitutional status.
220
 Some Baptists, upset with the ultimate 
 
 
 211. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 102, at 1592. 
 212. Id. The article would have provided: 
As God is the only worthy object of all religious worship, and nothing can be true religion but 
a voluntary obedience unto his revealed will, of which each rational soul has an equal right to 
judge for itself, every person has an unalienable right to act in all religious affairs according 
to the full persuasion of his own mind, where others are not injured thereby.  
Id.  
 213. Id. at 1592–93. 
 214. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1443; see also LAMBERT, supra note 139, at 223. 
 215. See Witte, supra note 178, at 31–32 (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. III).  
 216. Id. 
 217. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1443–44. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1443–44. 
 220. See LAMBERT, supra note 139, at 223. 
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institutionalization of a tax that trammeled their right to religious 
freedom, chose civil disobedience and refused to pay.
221
 
Although the new article nominally placed all Protestant 
denominations on equal footing, the groups were not treated equally 
in practice, a situation that exacerbated Evangelical discontent.
222
 
Town treasurers did not always respect the dissenters’ rights.223 For 
instance, in his Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty, Backus 
recorded for posterity that ―William White[,] a regular member of 
the baptist church in Ashfield, who lives in Chesterfield, and has 
had his standing in said church certified according to law; yet had a 
cow taken from him on August 25, 1773, and sold the 30th, for the 
pedobaptist ministers rate . . . .‖224 In addition, some courts held that 
only incorporated organizations could receive the funds that were 
earmarked by dissenters.
225
 This rule posed a problem because 
churches that were too small to employ a full-time minister were 
regularly denied corporate registration.
226
 Furthermore, the rule 
required Evangelical dissenters to seek the state’s approval, an 
action that directly conflicted with church doctrine.
227
  
In the face of mounting discontent, Massachusetts gave way and 
statutorily voided the judicial distinction between corporate and 
unincorporated churches.
228
 The new law provided that a dissenter 
could direct funds to ―teachers of an unincorporated as of a 
corporate religious society,‖229 but it was too little, too late. In 1833, 
when a group of delegates tried to strengthen the Article III church 
tax through constitutional amendment, the state instead passed a 
disestablishment amendment by an overwhelming majority.
230
  
 
 
 221. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1444 n.196. 
 222. See Witte, supra note 178, at 31. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Backus, supra note 202. 
 225. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1446–47 (citing the Cutter case); Witte, supra note 178, at 30; 
see also Barnes v. Inhabitants of First Parish, 6 Mass. 401 (Mass. 1810); Lovell v. Inhabitants of 
Parish, 7 Mass. 230 (Mass. 1810); Turner v. Inhabitants of Second Precinct, 7 Mass. 60 (Mass. 1810). 
 226. See Witte, supra note 178, at 31. 
 227. See Esbeck, supra note 103, at 1447; Witte, supra note 178, at 31. 
 228. See An Act Respecting Public Worship and Religious Freedom, 1811 Mass. Statutes, ch. 6 
(1811). 
 229. Id. § 1. 
 230. See THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, A MANUAL FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 177 (Wright & Potter, 2d ed. 1917). The amendment was adopted by a vote of 32,234 to 
3,273. See JOHN M. SWOMLEY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE SECULAR STATE 28 (1987). 
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New Article XI of the Massachusetts Constitution provided: 
[T]he several religious societies of this Commonwealth, 
whether corporate or unincorporate . . . shall ever have the 
right to elect their pastors or religious teachers, to contract 
with them for their support, to raise money for erecting and 
repairing houses of public worship, for the maintenance of 
religious instruction, and for the payment of necessary 
expenses . . . .
231
 
The legislature’s power to pass religious levies was gone.232 Church 
taxes had been permanently, albeit ploddingly, abolished in the 
United States. 
IV. GERMAN AND EARLY AMERICAN CHURCH TAXES:  
A COMPARISON 
Although German and early American church taxes are divided 
by an ocean and nearly two centuries, the foregoing accounts 
suggest that they bear more than a passing resemblance to one 
another. Both reached their logical conclusion in generalized 
assessments with exceptions for dissenters, and both have, at most 
times, fallen within the auspices of the state’s collection authority.233 
The German system, as it currently stands, has weathered nearly two 
hundred years and five iterations of government. The American 
system also lasted nearly two hundred years, and it, too, witnessed 
political upheaval.
234
 Why, then, has the German system persisted in 
modernity when the American system could not?  
The answer inheres in the differences between the two systems. 
First, the German government’s consistent acknowledgement of 
religious sovereignty effectively addresses the anti-establishment 
argument raised by the American Evangelical dissenters. Second, 
the ability of a German citizen to opt out of the tax attenuates, 
although it does not completely eliminate, the Enlightenment-based 
 
 
 231. MASS. CONST. art. XI (1833). 
 232. Id. 
 233. See discussion supra Part II. 
 234. See discussion supra Part III. 
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argument against encroachment upon individual religious liberty. 
Finally, the conception of the good underlying the German tax is 
more closely aligned with the German public’s conception of the 
good than was the case for the American tax. These three 
differences are key to any interpretive or normative assessment of 
the German system, and they are discussed in greater detail in the 
paragraphs that follow.  
A. Differences in Institutional Autonomy 
Both the German and American church tax systems began with 
established churches that were active participants in government.
235
 
In Germany, however, churches have consistently been treated as 
independent actors competent to conclude treaties and to collect 
tithes. Indeed, even today, German states honor existing concordats 
with the religious organizations, and religious organizations remain 
active participants in public life.
236
 Furthermore, Germany’s 
constitutional court has recognized that religious organizations 
treated as public law corporations possess some measure of 
sovereignty.
237
 This sovereignty is not merely a notional one over 
the spiritual realm, as was envisioned by the American Evangelical 
dissenters, but a set of temporal rights granted to public law 
religious organizations that are treated as public law corporations.
238
 
Within this set of rights is the autonomy to choose whether and how 
to interact with the government vis-à-vis the church tax.
239
  
Unlike the American system, Germany’s constitution lodges 
taxing power in the religious organizations themselves.
240
 
Organizations may choose whether to apply for public law 
corporation status, and, if accepted, they may choose whether to 
levy the tax.
241
 If a religious organization chooses to levy the tax, it 
is faced with an additional decision: what sort of tax to levy.
242
 
 
 
 235. See generally discussion supra Parts III and IV. 
 236. See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 36.  
 237. See 102 BVerfGE 379, supra note 47, at 388.  
 238. Id. at 371. 
 239. See discussion supra Part II. 
 240. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 241. See discussion supra Part II. 
 242. KiStG, supra note 58, § 3(1), SächsKiStG, supra note 58, § 4(1). 
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Then, depending upon the state of residence and the type of tax 
chosen, the religious organization may also choose the amount of 
the tax and who will be exempt from its reach.
243
 Finally, and 
importantly, it is the religious organization, and not the state, that 
decides who will collect the tax.
244
 State involvement in church tax 
collection only takes place upon the request of the levying 
organization.
245
 Thus, there is no possibility for the sort of doctrinal 
conflict that plagued early Virginia and Massachusetts. German 
organizations whose creeds mandate strict separation may choose 
that avenue. In effect, religious organizations may tailor their level 
of government interaction to meet their doctrinal requirements. This 
system of unilateral boundary setting by the organizations 
themselves is undoubtedly one strong factor in the church tax’s 
persistence in Germany, whereas unilateral boundary setting by the 
government was undoubtedly a strong contributor to the tax’s 
abolition in the United States.
246
 Religious organizations in the 
United States had no legal right to avoid the church tax system. 
Thus, religious sovereignty and institutional autonomy are protected 
by the German system in a way that was impossible under the 
American states’ general establishments. 
The concept of religious sovereignty in the early United States 
was more closely cabined, and the institutional autonomy of 
dissenting congregations was severely strained. Much of the late 
colonial and early federal thinking on religious sovereignty drew 
upon John Locke’s assertion that the ―care of souls cannot belong to 
the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward 
force; but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion 
of the mind . . . .‖247 It follows from this proposition that religious 
organizations should act on the basis of persuasion rather than force; 
therefore, in a Lockean state, they would lack what we conceive of 
 
 
 243. See KiStG § 1(2) (administration of the tax is the obligation of the church), § 11 (description 
of enforcement of the taxes under the statute). 
 244. See SächsKiStG §§ 9–10. 
 245. See id. 
 246. Other influences were, of course, myriad. I certainly do not suggest that the American 
emphasis on individual liberty and freedom from taxation should be discounted.  
 247. Locke, supra note 169. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
628 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:595 
 
 
 
 
today as temporal sovereignty. Certainly, under this ideal, they 
could not possess a state-enforced power to tax.
248
  
The United States’ different regard for religious organizational 
sovereignty was also evidenced in the structure of the early church 
taxes, which severely restricted institutional autonomy. In 
Maryland, Virginia, and Massachusetts, the taxing power was 
lodged in either the local legislature or the state legislative 
assembly.
249
 Religious organizations that sought additional public 
funds had no independent authority and were required to seek a 
legislative dispensation.
250
 This arrangement placed religious 
organizations in a subservient, rather than an independent, 
position.
251
  
B. Differences in Individual Religious Liberty 
A second significant difference between the American and 
German church taxes is the level of protection provided for 
individual religious liberty. The American system burdened all 
taxpayers regardless of their religious affiliation.
252
 In its early days, 
all of the tax dollars raised under the American system were directed 
to a single established church.
253
 Later, dissenters could direct their 
 
 
 248. The philosopher’s own writing confirms this position. Referring to the respective roles of 
civil government and religious organizations, Locke exhorted his readers:  
[T]he Church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The 
boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the 
things most remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies, which are in their original, 
end, business and in everything perfectly distinct . . . . 
Id. In Locke’s system, then, the church would only have jurisdiction over sectarian matters, and in 
these matters, the secular government would not intrude. These sentiments were employed to varying 
degrees by Madison, Jefferson, Backus, and others, and they indicate that the American conception of 
religious sovereignty during the disestablishment period differed greatly from that of the German 
constitutional court today. Church sovereignty in the early states was, at best, ephemeral; in Germany, 
it is actual. 
 249. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Furthermore, under the general establishment, even those congregations opposed to religious 
taxes were benefited by them when parishioners directed tax dollars to them. The Evangelical 
dissenters believed that rendering a tithe under governmental compulsion stripped the gift of its 
religious significance. They also believed that God required them to operate free from government 
support and coercion. They needed an exemption from the tax rather than the benefit of it. This option, 
which exists under the modern German system, was conspicuously absent from the American one.  
 252. See discussion supra Part VI. 
 253. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss4/3
  
 
 
 
 
2010] CAESAR AS GOD’S BANKER 629 
 
 
 
 
tax dollars to their own congregations, or in some instances, to 
public charity.
254
 But dissenters could not refuse to pay, and they 
could not tailor the amount of their giving to their individual 
beliefs.
255
 Nor could they engage in cyclical giving to account for 
changes in their own lives or changes in the life of their particular 
congregation.
256
 The religious tax, like other true taxes, was 
unavoidable. 
The German system protects individual religious liberty more 
effectively. Its recognition of religious sovereignty and institutional 
autonomy results in a de facto recognition of individual religious 
liberty. This is because religious organizations, rather than the 
government, levy the tax. Members of these organizations fall 
within the taxing jurisdiction of their congregations of their own 
volition. Consequently, those members who object to their religious 
organization’s imposition of the tax may avoid it by disclaiming 
their membership, or, to say it differently, by ―opting out‖ of the 
congregation’s jurisdiction. In fact, dissatisfied congregants may 
even take up membership in an organization of a similar 
denomination that does not levy the tax. Although the suggestion of 
changed membership resonates harshly at first, by definition, 
individuals who object to the giving obligations imposed by their 
religious organizations harbor beliefs that differ from those 
espoused by the organizations themselves. This difference between 
the personal belief of an individual and the doctrine of that 
individual’s religious organization falls outside of the German 
government’s purview. It is wholly within the individual’s 
discretion to decide whether the difference is significant enough to 
merit attrition. Such a choice was not available to taxpayers under 
the American system. Accordingly, individual religious liberty is 
preserved, albeit imperfectly, to a greater extent in the German 
system.  
 
 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
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C. Differences in the Conception of the Good 
A third significant difference between the German and the 
American systems is the conception of the good undergirding them. 
At the time of American disestablishment, it was argued that church 
taxes were necessary to pay the salaries of Christian ministers, who 
aided in the preservation of civil society.
257
 In other words, 
proponents of religious assessments asserted that churches should 
benefit from government establishment because they provided moral 
instruction necessary to the maintenance of social order.
258
 In fact, a 
significant portion of early American church tax dollars were paid 
directly to Congregational and Anglican ministers whose job it was 
to expound upon the evils of drinking, dancing, and carousing.
259
  
In contrast, Germany’s established religious organizations have 
assumed an important additional role: in many cases, they are the 
predominate local suppliers of public goods. Accordingly, they are 
responsible for the provision of a substantial portion of local social 
services.
260
 These services, which are equally available to members 
and non-members in most cases, include kindergartens, recreation 
centers, schools, nursing homes, and hospitals, among other 
things.
261
 Unlike early American churches, then, German religious 
organizations have adopted a separate secular governance function 
in response to societal change, causing Professor Franz Walter to 
describe them as ―service points for the provision of welfare 
services and ritual acts when they are required in the life cycle of a 
secularised society that is otherwise indifferent to churches.‖262 This 
adaptation to secularization—a conception of the good that has 
evolved in response to societal evolution—stands in stark contrast to 
the inflexible position of early American religious institutions and 
 
 
 257. See Dreisbach, supra note 153, at 173; THE FOUNDERS ON GOD & GOVERNMENT, supra note 
163, at 3–4.  
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See Robbers, supra note 40, at 63 (churches provide charitable works, the absence of which 
would vitiate the constitution’s guarantee of a social state). 
 261. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 36; see also Christine Sticht, The Role of Churches 
in Germany—Introduction, GOETHE-INSTITUT, May 2004, http://www.goethe.de/ges/phi/dos/rkd/en 
2012816.htm. 
 262. Sticht, supra note 261. 
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may, in some part, explain the persistence of Germany’s church tax 
system.  
V. THE CHALLENGE OF INCREASING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY 
Despite the fact that Germany’s church tax system preserves the 
autonomy of religious organizations, allows individuals to opt out of 
payment, and funds the provision of public goods, a number of 
commentators have called for both governmental and ecclesiastical 
reassessment of the practice.
263
 Although modern day Germany is 
politically, socially, and economically quite different from the early 
United States, some of the arguments advanced by German critics 
today are similar to those espoused by the famous voices of the 
American disestablishment. Both share a concern that religious 
taxes impinge upon individual liberty. Both find such taxes 
questionable in light of a change in the religious composition of the 
society: increased diversity in the case of the early states and 
increased diversity and secularism in the case of Germany. Finally, 
both question the influence of the state upon the church and vice 
versa.  
The following paragraphs assess the likelihood that these shared 
criticisms will produce a shared result and conclude that Germany’s 
tax need not meet the same fate as its American predecessor. 
Differences in the German tax’s structure and the use of its proceeds 
make it fundamentally different from the early American system, 
and, as a result, vitiate the doctrinal concerns raised by the 
American Evangelical dissenters and Enlightenment politicians. 
Instead, increased secularism and religious diversity draw the 
continued vitality of the German system into question. An 
appropriate response to this metamorphosis is crucial. Failure of the 
German church tax system would jeopardize more than the 
provision of religious services; it would have a significantly 
negative impact on the provision of locally funded public goods. 
 
 
 263. See, e.g., Christa Pongratz-Lippitt, Funding System of German Church Challenged, THE 
TABLET, Aug. 22, 2009, available at http://www.thetablet.co.uk/article/13541 (―A canon lawyer's 
attempts to end compulsory church tax in Germany have thrown the German Church on the defensive 
and triggered a national debate about the justification of the tax.‖).  
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A. Increased Religious Diversity as a Destabilizing Influence 
If neither the evangelical nor the Enlightenment arguments 
against the early American church tax find purchase in the modern 
German system, is the German tax necessarily on stable footing? 
Increased religious diversity in the early United States as a result of 
immigration and the Great Awakening destabilized the various 
states’ establishments. The presence of religious minority groups in 
communities likely led to greater tolerance of differently-minded 
neighbors. And the principle of tolerance on a personal level, 
although perhaps slow to catch fire in more homogeneous areas of 
the country, dovetailed with the Revolutionary idea that all men are 
created equal. Increased acceptance of religious differences likely 
contributed to increased religious mobility from established 
churches to non-established ones.  
Similar influences may be at work in Germany today.
264
 The 
country has seen increases in both religion and agnosticism in 
different segments of the population.
265
 First, and notably, the 
reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 brought a sizeable 
agnostic and atheist population into the religious framework 
established by the Weimar Constitution.
266
 Religious organizations 
were highly disfavored by East Germany’s communist government, 
and even today, less than twenty percent of the population of the 
former East is affiliated with a religious organization.
267
 Although 
these citizens were originally concentrated in their states of origin, 
in the years since Germany’s reunification they have migrated 
throughout the country.
268
 It is likely that their ideas will travel with 
them. In other words, redistribution will contribute to increased 
acceptance of religious non-membership in the heavily religious, if 
mostly unobservant, West.
269
 
 
 
 264. William E. Downey, Church Taxes in Germany: Not Taking the Pledge, 114 CHRISTIAN 
CENTURY 23 (1997) (demographic shifts and social development have corresponded with lower 
church tax revenues). 
 265. Id. 
 266. See Conway, supra note 31, at 727–31; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 36. 
 267. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 36. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Rainer Ilgner, former Deputy Secretary of the German Catholic Bishops’ Conference, 
described the evolving situation succinctly: ―Society has changed now, and many people think that if 
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The reunification of East and West is not the only source of 
religious diversity currently putting pressure on the German social 
structure. Immigration from countries that are predominantly 
Muslim has increased the presence of non-Christian religious 
organizations in Germany.
270
 Although it is impossible to predict the 
impact of these organizations on the German establishment, it is 
likely that the church tax system will be forced to adjust to changing 
demographics. Historically, Muslim congregations have not applied 
for public corporation status, primarily because they are independent 
and not governed by an umbrella organization such as the Protestant 
Landeskirche or Catholic Diocese.
271
 Furthermore, individual 
congregations have been divided on the issue of government 
interaction.
272
 When viewed in terms of the geographic 
concentration of Muslim communities, this non-participation may 
be problematic. Unlike their Catholic or Evangelical counterparts, 
 
 
it’s all right to leave a spouse, why can’t they leave the church?‖ Craig R. Whitney, Church Tax Cuts 
the German Fold, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at A12. 
 270. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 36. 
 271. With government facilitation, an umbrella group called the Coordination Council of Muslims 
in Germany was founded in 2007. See New Umbrella Group Founded, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Apr. 11, 
2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,476563,00.html. To date, however, the 
group has proved divisive and has not applied for public law corporation status. See Charles Hawley, 
Germany’s Difficult Debate with Its Muslim Community, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Mar. 14, 2008, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,541493,00.html (the Muslim Coordinating 
Council, which tends toward conservatism, represents only twenty percent of Germany’s Muslims); 
Mark Chalîl Bodenstein, Muslim Associations: New Figures but No End to the Debate, DEUTSCHE 
ISLAM KONFERENZ, Feb. 10, 2009, available at http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/SubSites/ 
DIK/EN/InDeutschland/MuslimOrganisationen/VerbaendeMLD/verbaende-mld-node.html (although 
four Muslim organizations claim a stake in the governmental debate, fewer than twenty-five percent of 
Muslims feel that they are adequately represented by any of these groups). 
 272. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 36. Recently, however, the German government 
and some Muslim leaders have made a concerted effort to form an umbrella organization that would 
apply for public law corporation status. Id.; see also New Umbrella Group Founded, supra note 271 
(reporting a new umbrella group, Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany, formed to represent 
interests of Muslims before the German government). Although formation of the group was initially 
hailed as a success, it seems to have made little progress. See Hawley, supra note 271; Bodenstein, 
supra note 271. A variety of possible results come to mind vis-à-vis the church tax. First, a significant 
portion of the Muslim community could coalesce in favor of public corporation status, but in light of 
past disagreements, this seems unlikely. Second, the Muslim community could uniformly reject the 
effort. This, too, seems unlikely. Third, and most probable, the Muslim community could engage in 
internal debate on the desirability of participating in the church tax system. Unlike prior Muslim 
conversations on the issue, this one will have the full attention of the government due to its role as a 
catalyst, and the full attention of the public, which has struggled with integration. A focused debate on 
the merits and demerits of the church tax is a prerequisite to meaningful change of the system. Thus, it 
is possible that Muslim immigration to Germany may be a continental reprise of the role played by 
conversion during the Great Awakening in the United States. 
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Muslim congregations that provide community services are not 
assured a stable source of funding. In addition, it is possible (indeed, 
likely) that the inclusion of Muslim congregations as public 
corporations and the provision of public goods to people of all faiths 
by those congregations would promote integration overall. 
What is the likely church tax outcome of Germany’s changing 
demographics? Increased diversity of religious beliefs in West 
Germany, where church tax constituents are concentrated, may lead 
to increased acceptance of mobility between and out of religious 
organizations. It may also lead to increased concern about free-
riding. These changed positions will lend additional strength to 
public perception of religious affiliation as a matter of personal 
choice and will weaken the moral argument against transferring 
from a religious organization that levies a tax to one that does not.
273
 
In fact, data indicate that this may already be taking place.
274
 In 
addition, discussion within and about the Muslim community will 
focus national attention on the treatment of religious organizations 
as public law corporations.
275
  
These two factors—increased religious diversity and increased 
debate—were present in the American disestablishment, albeit in 
different forms, and may force established Germany to reevaluate its 
position on the connection between religion and state-enforced 
charitable giving. In such an instance, state governments must 
consider whether the public goods and services provided by 
religious organizations are essential, and if so, decide how best to 
fund them. It is plausible that governments could choose to leave 
non-essential services in the care of religious institutions but 
increase government financial support of those services. This is not, 
 
 
 273. Of course, one would expect fewer inter-faith transfers than intra-faith transfers. So, for 
instance, if all Jewish congregations levy the tax, the effect of increased secularism and religious 
diversity will affect them less. Protestant congregations, on the other hand, may see substantial shifts 
in membership, because some levy the tax and others do not. 
 274. Note, though, that attrition from the church tax system could also be a reaction to Germany’s 
continued imposition of the solidarity tax, which was originally earmarked for expenses associated 
with the country’s reunification. See Downey, supra note 264, at 23 (important factors in decline of 
church tax revenue include increased retirement, high unemployment, demographic shifts, and changes 
in the federal tax laws). 
 275. See Hawley, supra note 271 (ongoing debate over religious education and the wording of a 
document declaring Muslim allegiance to the constitution—required for public law corporation 
status—will spark an overdue examination of overall integration). 
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however, the only alternative. Instead, governments could create 
coextensive non-sectarian taxing jurisdictions. Stated differently, 
German states could permit secular quasi-governmental actors to 
engage in non-geographically bounded taxation, as described in the 
next section. 
VI. THE CHURCH TAX AS A NON-GEOGRAPHICALLY BOUNDED  
LOCAL TAX 
In essence, the German church tax is a local tax delineated not by 
geography, but by religious preference. The proceeds of the tax, 
while used in part for religious purposes, are also used to fund 
essential public goods that are available to individuals regardless of 
their religious affiliation. When viewed in combination with the 
limited form of sovereignty vested in religious organizations by 
Germany’s constitution and highest court, it becomes clear that the 
viability of the tax need not rest with the religious conviction of 
Germany’s citizens or with the taxing will of its local politicians. 
Instead, Germany may adapt its existing structure to the changing 
religious composition of its society.  
One way to accomplish this goal would be to create non-
geographically bounded tax jurisdictions that would mimic the tax 
jurisdictions of religious organizations. These jurisdictions would 
include only individuals who are not members of religious 
organizations that levy a tax. The term ―non-geographically 
bounded‖ is appropriate because, although the jurisdiction of 
religious organizations depends to some extent on geography, its 
key denominator is the willing participation of members. By 
disclaiming membership in a particular taxing organization, 
individuals can effectively opt out of that organization’s reach. The 
same would be true of secular non-geographically bounded 
jurisdictions. 
The creation of such jurisdictions within German localities could 
serve several beneficial functions. First and foremost, in areas where 
the church tax is ineffective, such as Muslim communities or the 
former East, non-sectarian opt-out tax jurisdictions could fulfill the 
role typically assumed by the Catholic and Evangelical churches, 
providing structural equivalence between these communities and 
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their heavily Christian counterparts. Structural uniformity among 
localities should equate to greater efficiency and equality in 
distribution of state social services and benefits. Second, the use of 
non-sectarian opt-out tax jurisdictions could alleviate current church 
taxpayers’ concerns about free-riding. This could lead to a greater 
perception of fairness among current taxpayers which, in turn, could 
result in a lower attrition rate among the existing jurisdictions.  
The existence of secular jurisdictions as counterparts to sectarian 
jurisdictions would also provide religious and non-religious 
individuals with equal access to moral opportunities, thus serving an 
important expressive function. Under the current system, individuals 
who support taxation for the provision of public goods by a non-
governmental organization must also choose membership in a 
religious organization. Individuals having a preference for the 
former position but not the latter are faced with two unsatisfactory 
choices: they can participate in the tax and join the organization, or 
they can fail to participate in the tax and avoid joining the 
organization. Neither of these options expresses the individual’s true 
preference. By disaggregating participation and religious affiliation, 
adoption of secular non-geographically bounded tax jurisdictions 
would provide a full range of expressive options.  
Finally, the analysis is not pertinent solely to Germany. As I will 
explore more fully in a subsequent work, Germany’s church tax 
system provides insight not only into the uniquely American debate 
surrounding disestablishment in the United States, but also into 
potentially novel forms of local public finance. A system of public 
finance modeled after the German tax would have two salient 
features: first, it would be bounded by preference affiliation rather 
than geography, and second, participants could remove themselves 
from the taxing jurisdiction by ending their preference affiliation. 
More simply put, it would be a system of opt-out public finance that 
could be used to supplement or replace portions of non-essential 
spending in current local systems. Although a system of opt-out 
taxation seems wildly improbable at first blush, the high 
participation rate in Germany’s system indicates that its basic 
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structure is not without merit.
276
 In some United States localities, 
stickiness of a default option, people’s unwillingness to deviate 
from the norm of public support, and actual enthusiasm for public 
goods may result in participation levels similar to those observed in 
Germany.  
Even if most residents of United States localities opted out of 
participation in a preference-bounded jurisdiction, such a system 
could still produce democratic gains. Local governments could 
obtain the benefit of electoral input and collaborative decision-
making by allowing taxpayers to opt out of their obligation to pay 
for appropriately identified non-essential expenses. If viable, the use 
of an opt-out system to engage in proportional decision-making on 
certain government non-essential expenditures would alter the 
dialogue between residents and local governments, foster debate 
among residents themselves, and provide a more equitable and 
efficient allocation of resources. To be clear, I do not forward 
preference-bounded revenue collection solely as a means of raising 
revenue; rather, it also should serve as both an instrument and gauge 
of democracy. The resulting creation of political dialogue on 
discretionary governmental spending could result in resource 
allocation that more accurately reflects the allocation preferences of 
constituents while also giving a voice to those constituents who are 
marginalized by traditional representative government. The result 
could be something not yet achieved by local tax systems in the 
United States: the creation of a stable combination of representative 
and direct democracy in the arena of public finance. 
 
 
 276. Although only 22.5% of Germans are religiously active, almost two-thirds are members of a 
religious organization that levies the church tax. See Sticht, supra note 261. 
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